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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY,
A Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff and Re8pondent,
vs.
STANLEY MOZLEY PERKINS,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT~s

Case No. 9077

BRIEF

S'TATEMENT OF FA·CT
This is an appeal from a case originating in
the Salt Lake City Court wherein the District Court,
after a trial de novo, entered a judgment of conviction to the charge of driving an automobile while
under the influence of intox'icating liquor. The only
question that can now be p1~operly determined by
the Supreme Court is that which involves the validity or constitutionality of a statute. In other cases,
of course, the decision of the Distt~ict Cou1'1s on such
appeals is final.
1
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In this case, appellant was arl~ested on Octo-ber, 27, 1958 at Salt La.kc City, Utah and was induced to submit to a blood alcohol test without hav..
ing been offered the choice of the alternative tests
under Section 41-6-44.10 of the Laws
1957, (R.
21) . ·The arresting officer on direct examination
testified that he asked appellant if he would submit
lo a blood alcohol test and testified that ''after,
when we finally got to the County Hospital, he finally consente~ yes.. At that time he didn't say
Hyes" 01~ '~no}', he wanted more advice to it.'' (R.
14). On cross examination the arresting officer
advised that he had a continual conversation '\Vith
appellant from the time of a1·rest to time of taking
appellant to the police station and then to the Salt
Lake County Hospital and stated that appellant
refused at first to take the blood test. (R. 19).
Appellant wanted to know what his rights were and
the arresting officer at no time told ·him that he
had the alternativ·e choice of several tests under the
statute above referred to. The arresting officer, in
attempting to explain to appellant what his rights
were stated in substance that if he didn't take the
blood tests that it was the procedure on refusal that
his license would be re,roked. ( R. 20) .

of

Further, the arresting officer did ndt advise
appellant that he had the right to have his physician take a ·blood test in addition to the test taken ..
2
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The arresting officer was not aware that appellant
had such a right.. ( R. 20) .
It is clear that the arresting officer at no time
mentioned any other type other than the blood test
to defendant. (R. 21),
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POll\~

I

SECTION 41-6-44.10 LA,VS OF UTAH~ 1957, GNDER
\VHICH APPELLANT WAS INDUCED TO SUBMIT TO
BLOOD TEST JS IKV ALID AND UNOONSTJTUTJONATJ.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 41-6-44.10 LA\VS OF UTAH, 1957, UNDER
WHICH APPELLANT \VAS INDUCED TO SUBMIT TO
BLOOD TEST IS lNV ALID AND UNCO~STITU
TIONAL.

Appellant contends that the statute in question
constitutes a violation of the state and federal constitutional provisions. Indeed, this court has only
recently announced that it has ~'grave doubts as to
the validity of the statute4 '~ Ri1tg-u;ood vs. State,
8 Utah (2d) 287, 33 P. 2d 943~ At least, the original
opinion filed herein so indicated.
Tlhe statute, of course, provides that a driver
is deemed to give his consent to a chemical test of
his breath, blood, urine OI' saliva for the purpose of
3
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determining the alcoholic content of his blood, etc.
This court in the case of Rin-gtttood vs. State, su-pra,
held that 'the intent of the statute \Vas that the subject could comply by giv-ring a test of anyone of the

substances. In that case, as in the present case, the
officer confronted the drivel~ with the choice that he
must give his blood fot~ the test or his license would
be revoked. This court held that such procedure was
not in acco1·dance with the requirements of the
statute and thei·e was no valid basis fo1.j revoking
of the license. ';vhile, of course, the facts of this
case are at variance with those of the Ringu•ood
case, we respectfully su·bmit and m~ge that under

the circumstances of the present case the evidence
as obtained by the illegal procedure under the above
statute should not ·be available to respondent to
sustain the conviction. In other words, appellant
contends that because of the failure of respondents
to comply with the terms of the statutet i.e.~ to give
the alternative choices of the type of test least obj ec'ti onable to appellant, that it res ul'ts in an unconstitutional application of the statute in question,
and is invalid as to appellant, even though no proceedings were taken thereunder to revoke appellant's license.
It should ·be noted tha't the arresting officer
engaged the appellant in almost continual conversation and admitted that appellant at first refused
4
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to consent to any blood test and after purportedly
advising the appellant as to what his rights were,
(R. 19-20), the arresting officer finally brought
the ma=tter up for decision and appellant finally
consented (R. lti-20). The officer utterly and misera·bly failed to carry out the intent and purpose
of the statute which definitely and absolutely affected appellant's rights by the unlawful application of the statute. It is not a question alone of defendant~s guilt or innocence, but of the illegal and
inept manner in \vhich law officers have ·been allowed to use coercion by insisting that the accused
must submit to a blood test or thai his driver's
license would be revokecL
CO~CLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that a decision as

to the validity of Section 41-6-44.10 Laws of -ctah,
1957 in its application to the facts at hand, should
have been made in the District Court, and in any
event the Supreme Court should declare said statute unconstitutional and invalid.
Respectfully submitted,
VERL C. RITCHIE
Attorney for Appellant
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